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PART II 
Public Law 
CHAPTER 11 
Constitutional Law 
JOHN D. O'REILLY, JR. 
§ll.l. General. During the course of the 1958 SURVEY year the 
Supreme Judicial Court had occasion to rule upon a number of consti-
tutional issues. Most of these rulings were of a rather routine nature 
and did not make significant contributions to the body of constitu-
tional law. They are, however, worthy of note, since they will carry 
the value of precedent and some of them will doubtless constitute parts 
of the masonry out of which the meaningful doctrine of the future 
will be constructed. 
The "public purpose," towards which official action must be di-
rected, had to be defined in two cases. In the first of these 1 the Mas-
sachusetts Turnpike Authority 2 had made a taking of certain land so 
as to leave the balance of the landowner's property without access to 
any highway. To correct this situation the Authority condemned an 
easement and gave the owner of the landlocked property a private way 
thereover to a public way. The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the 
taking of the easement was for a public purpose, although it did not 
relate directly to the turnpike itself. The case also presented a difficult 
problem of statutory construction, since the enabling act, unlike the 
general act for laying out highways,S did not contain express author-
iZ;ltion to acquire easements of the sort here involved. 
JOHN D. O'REILLY, JR., is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and a 
member of the Bars of Massachusetts, the District of Columbia, and the United 
States Supreme Court. 
The author wishes to acknowledge the research assistance of Philip T. Riley of 
the Board of Student Editors of the ANNUAL SURVEY. 
§ll.l. 1 Luke v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 567, 
149 N.E.2d 225. 
2 Acts of 1952, c. 354. 
S G.L., c. 81, §7A. 
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The second case was an advisory opinion 4 in which the justices 
ruled that the celebration of the anniversary of a historic event, such 
as the Civil War or the Spanish-American War, is a public purpose for 
which funds may be appropriated and expended out of the public 
treasury. This advisory opinion also covered a number of other 
points. It indicated that when a legislative body seeks an advisory 
opinion, both the proposed legislation and the questions concerning it 
must be phrased clearly and specifically enough to enable the justices 
to give a specific answer. Failure in these respects will result either in 
the justices declining to answer, or in their giving no better than a 
qualified answer. The opinion also ruled that it would not be per-
missible to authorize expenditure of public funds by an unpaid com-
mission, composed in part of nominees of unofficial organizations. 
The justices also ruled that the doctrine of separation of powers, as 
set forth in Article XXX of the Declaration of Rights, does not forbid 
the legislature to provide that the Governor shall be, ex-officio, a 
member of a commission established to plan celebration of the anni-
versary of a historic event. 
Another advisory opinion IS ruled that, despite dicta in some earlier 
cases,6 there is no constitutional objection to modification of the com-
mon law of dower and curtesy by providing that, from the effective 
date of legislation, a surviving spouse shall have dower (or curtesy, as 
the case may be) only in such land as was owned by the deceased spouse 
at the time of death. The bill was subsequently enacted by both 
houses of the General Court, but was subjected to pocket veto by the 
Governor after prorogation. 
In Commonwealth v. Ries 7 a witness declined to answer a question 
concerning his dealings with the defendant on the ground that the 
answer might tend to incriminate him. The Supreme Judicial Court 
ruled that the defendant was properly forbidden to comment, in argu-
ment to the jury, upon the claim of privilege, since the privilege is 
personal to the witness, and no inferences, favorable or unfavorable, 
may be drawn, with respect to the defendant, from the claim of privi-
lege by the witness. 
Due process of law in criminal proceedings was the subject of rulings 
in two cases.s Separate indictments were returned against the defend-
ants in these cases for participation in the same criminal episode. The 
indictments were handed up in May and August, 1952. Each of the 
accused was apprehended in 1953, and each was prosecuted for other 
crimes, convicted and sent to prison. They were not brought to trial 
on the 1952 indictments until May, 1955. Both defendants moved, at 
that time, to quash the indictments on the ground that they had been 
4 Opinion of the Justices, 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 887, 150 N.E.2d 693. 
1\ Opinion of the Justices, 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1071, 151 N.E.2d 475. 
6 Hanscom v. Malden &: Melrose Gas Light Co., 220 Mass. I, 107 N.E. 426 (1914); 
Dunn v. Sargent, 101 Mass. 336 (1869). 
71958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 851,150 N.E.2d 527. 
S Commonwealth v. Hanley, 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 653, 149 N.E.2d 608; Common-
wealth v. Drolet, 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 665, 149 N.E.2d 616. 
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denied the constitutional right of speedy trial.9 The Supreme Judicial 
Court agreed that the Massachusetts Constitution gives a defendant in 
a criminal case the right to a speedy trial, but decided that in the 
Hanley and Drolet cases the defendants had waived the right, since 
they had not affirmatively claimed it, and the record showed no dis-
ability on their part to demand trial during the period between arrest 
and arraignment on the indictments in question. 
In the Drolet case the defendant, who was charged with armed 
assault with intent to rob, after arraignment but before trial repre-
sented that he was indigent and desired counsel. The trial judge ap-
pointed counsel but the defendant refused to allow the appointed 
attorney to represent him. When the trial opened, the judge refused 
to appoint another attorney for the defendant. The Supreme Judicial 
Court held that this did not involve a denial of any constitutional 
right of the defendant, particularly since it did not appear that he was 
constitutionally entitled to the assistance of assigned counsel on the 
ground that 
... by reason of youth, inexperience, or incapacity of some kind, 
or by reason of some unfair conduct by the public authorities, or 
of some complication of issues, or of some special prejudice or dis-
advantage ... [he was] in need of counsel in order to secure the 
fundamentals of a fair trial.1° 
Contentions that equal protection of the laws had been denied were 
rejected in two cases. In Pierce v. Town of Wellesleyp the zoning 
by-law of a town was amended so as to include "municipally owned 
or operated public parking lots" among the permitted uses of premises 
in single residence districts. It was contended that this was an unlaw-
ful discrimination against privately owned or operated parking lots 
but the Court rejected the contention, pointing out that the public in-
terest in traffic control afforded a rational basis for permitting public 
operation of parking lots in areas where private operation of such lots 
is prohibited. In the other case, the justification of discriminatory 
treatment under the law was not made so clear. In Colgate-Palmolive 
Co. v. Elm Farm Foods CO.12 it was decided that retailers who sell 
fair-traded goods at the established fair-trade price and give purchasers 
of these goods trading stamps or other premium-yielding artifacts are 
subject to injunction for violation of the Fair Trade Law.13 The 
defendants objected that the law thus construed discriminates against 
merchants who sell for cash by forbidding them to give their customers 
9 Mass. Const., Declaration of Rights, Art. XI. The defendants also contended 
that similar rights accrued to them under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. The Court's disposition of the cases made it unnecessary to 
discuss this point. 
10 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 665, 667, 668, 149 N.E.2d 616, 618, citing and quoting 
Allen v. Commonwealth, 324 Mass. 558, 562, 87 N.E.2d 192, 195 (1949). 
11336 Mass. 517, 146 N.E.2d 666 (1957). 
121958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 471,148 N.E.2d 861. 
13 G.L., c. 93, §§14A-14D. 
3
O'Reilly: Chapter 11: Constitutional Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 2012
112 1958 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §ll.l 
trading inducements similar in value to the credit extended to cus-
tomers by merchants who accept deferred payments. The Court recog-
nized that the law treated the two classes of merchants differently but 
concluded, without articulating the point, that this did not constitute 
a deprivation of equal protection of the laws. 
The question of whether a state law impaired the obligation of 
contract was considered and resolved in New Bedford v. New Bedford, 
Woods Hole, etc. Steamship Authority,14 The authority, a public cor-
poration, was created to provide adequate transportation between the 
mainland and the islands of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard.15 Its 
vessels operate between the islands and the mainland city of New 
Bedford and the town of Falmouth (Woods Hole). Because the islands 
are summer resort areas, the patronage of the authority's vessels is 
much greater in the summer than in other seasons, and the practice of 
the authority was to suspend service to and from New Bedford during 
the autumn and winter months. This, it has been held, was within 
the power of the authority.16 The authority's vessels and other prop-
erty have been financed by revenue bonds, of which some $6,500,000 
are outstanding. The enabling act 17 provides that, "While any bonds 
issued by the Authority remain outstanding, the powers, duties or 
existence of the Authority shall not be diminished or impaired in any 
way that will affect adversely the interests and rights of the holders of 
such bonds." A 1956 statute18 requires the authority to provide 
throughout the year daily service to and from New Bedford, as well as 
Falmouth and the islands. The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the 
contention that this statute impaired the obligation of the authority'S 
contract with the bondholders by increasing the possibility of opera-
tional deficits and thus reducing the ability of the authority to pay 
bond interest and principal. The Court pointed to the section of the 
enabling act 19 which provides that if the authority'S income and re-
serves shall be insufficient to pay debt service on its bonds, the amount 
of the deficiency shall be payable out of the state treasury, to be reim-
bursed by a tax levy on the communities served by the authority. This 
undertaking on the part of the Commonwealth, the Court concluded, 
is the ultimate security of the bondholders, and as long as this security 
remains unimpaired the rights of bondholders are not affected ad-
versely. 
14336 Mass. 651, 148 N.E.2d 637 (1958). On October 20, 1958, the Supreme Court 
of the United States dismissed an appeal "for want of a substantial federal ques· 
tion." Boston Five Cent Savings Bank v. New Bedford, 358 U.S. 53, 79 Sup. Ct. 95, 
3 L. Ed. 2d 46 (1958). 
15 Acts of 1948, c. 544. 
16 New Bedford v. New Bedford, Woods Hole, etc. Steamship Authority, 330 
Mass. 422, 114 N.E.2d 553 (1953). 
17 Acts of 1948, c. 544, §6. 
18 Acts of 1956, c. 747. The justices had already rendered an advisory opinion 
that the statute was valid. Opinion of the Justices, 334 Mass. 765, 138 N.E.2d 212 
(1956). In the New Bedford case it was pointed out that advisory opinions are not 
binding, and that questions resolved by such opinions are subject to examination 
anew in actual litigation. 
19 Acts of 1948, c. 544, §9. 
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§I1.2. Lord's Day Statute: "Establishment of religion." The valid-
ity of the "Observance of the Lord's Day" statu tel in the light of pro-
visions of the Massachusetts Constitution 2 concerning religious liberty 
and equality was considered and sustained in Commonwealth v. Cher-
nock.s The defendant operated a kosher market which, because of his 
religious convictions, was closed every Saturday, as well as on Jewish 
holidays. On several Sundays, after ten o'clock in the forenoon, he 
kept the market open and sold kosher meats and groceries. These 
sales did not come within the statutory provision 4 that permits sales of 
kosher meat on Sundays by persons such as the defendant between the 
hours of six and ten in the morning. The defendant was, accordingly, 
convicted under the statutory provision 5 which forbids the keeping 
open of a shop on Sunday. His exceptions were overruled. 
On the constitutional point the Supreme Judicial Court sustained 
the statute, as applied to the defendant, upon the authority of Com-
monwealth v. Has.6 That case sustained an earlier version of the 
statute over objection based upon Article XI of the Amendments, 
which provides (among other things) that" ... all religious sects and 
denominations, demeaning themselves peaceably, and as good citizens 
of the commonwealth, shall be equally under the protection of the 
law; and no subordination of anyone sect or denomination to another 
shall ever be established by law." In Chernock the Court inferentially. 
by its citation 7 of Glaser v. Congregation Kehillath Israel,s ruled that 
there is no more force in an objection to the statute based upon Section 
1 of Article XLVI of the Amendments, "No law shall be passed pro-
hibiting the free exercise of religion." 
In Has the Sunday laws were treated as labor laws, designed to pro-
mote public health and welfare by providing a mandatory periodic 
respite from work. This is the theory subsequently summarized in the 
classic dictum of Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the Supreme Court of 
the United States:9 "Such laws have always been deemed beneficent 
and merciful laws, especially to the poor and dependent, to the la-
borers in our factories and workshops and in the heated rooms of our 
cities, and their validity has been sustained by the highest courts of 
the states." 10 
The Massachusetts Court, in Has, pointed out that the Sunday laws 
imposed no obligation to participate in religious ceremonies or to par-
ticipate in any form of worship, and that, as to one who chooses an-
other day of the week for religious observance, the burden imposed 
by the Sunday laws". . . is not occasioned by any subordination of his 
§11.2. 1 C.L., c. 136, §5. 
2 Mass. Const., Amend. XI and XLVI. 
8336 Mass. 384, 145 N.E.2d 920 (1957). 
4 C.L., c. 136, §6. 
5Id. §5. 
6 122 Mass. 40 (1877). 
7336 Mass. 384, 386, 145 N.E.2d 920, 922 (1957). 
8263 Mass. 435,437, 161 N.E. 619, 620 (1928). 
9 Soon Ring v. Crowley, II3 U.S. 703, 5 Sup. Ct. 730,28 L. Ed. 1145 (1885). 
10 II3 U.S. at 710, 5 Sup. Ct. at 734, 28 L. Ed. at II47. 
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religion, but because as a member of the community he must submit 
to the rules which are made by lawful authority to regulate and govern 
the business of that community." 11 
When, however, a Sunday law came before the Supreme Judicial 
Court in another context, it was viewed as something more than a 
provision for promotion of the physical and material welfare of the 
people.12 In ruling upon the civil consequences of violation of such a 
law the Court said: "Our Puritan ancestors intended that the day 
should be not merely a day of rest from labor, but also a day devoted 
to public and private worship and to religious meditation and repose, 
undisturbed by secular cares or amusements." 13 There are cases in 
other jurisdictions in which similar sentiments are expressed,14 but 
perhaps the more prevalent judicial viewpoint is that Christian reli-
gious attitudes form a background for Sunday legislation which can 
be constitutionally justified on the basis of conventional "police 
power" doctrine.15 
These matters may have been thrown into a different perspective in 
consequence of the determination, in 1947, of the Supreme Court of 
the United States that the substance of the "an establishment of reli-
gion" clause of the First Amendment is, by virtue of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, a limitation upon state action.16 Although the actual 
decision in Everson sustained the validity of the state act of using 
public funds to pay for transportation to Catholic parochial schools, 
there occurs in the course of the opinion the following dictum: 
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment 
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government 
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, 
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.17 
This dictum seemed to receive literal implementation in McCollum 
v. Board of Education,18 in which a program for giving religious in-
struction to pupils in public schools, available to all faiths which de-
sired to participate, was held to be repugnant to the Constitution of 
the United States. Subsequently, however, by a literal reading of 
McCollum, the Supreme Court seems to have receded from the position 
of literal adherence to the Everson dictum.19 In Zorach, the United 
States Supreme Court refused to disapprove a program for giving reli-
11 122 Mass. 40,42 (1877). 
12 Davis v. Somerville, 128 Mass. 594 (1880). 
13 128 Mass. at 596. 
140'Donnell v. Sweeney, 5 Ala. 467 (1843); Brimhall v. Van Campen, 8 Minn. 1 
(1858); Commonwealth v. American Baseball Club. 290 Pa. 136, 138 At!. 497 (1927). 
15 Carr v. State, 175 Ind. 241, 93 N.E. 1071 (1911); Levering v. Board, 134 Md. 48, 
106 At!. 176 (1919); Moore v. Owen, 58 Misc. 332, 109 N.Y. Supp. 585 (Sup. Ct. 
1908); State v. Barnes, 22 N.D. 18, 132 N.W. 215 (1911). 
16 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. I, 67 Sup. Ct. 504, 91 L. Ed. 711 
(1947). 
17 330 U.S. at 15,67 Sup. Ct. at 511, 91 L. Ed. at 723. 
18333 U.S. 203. 68 Sup. Ct. 461. 92 L. Ed. 649 (1948). 
19 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 72 Sup. Ct. 679, 96 L. Ed. 954 (1952). 
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gious instruction to public school pupils away from the school prem-
ises. 
What bearing these developments will have upon the Sunday ob-
servance laws of the various states remains to be seen. Prior to the 
Everson case of 1947, when the principles of the First Amendment 
were first considered in connection with the prohibitions of the Four-
teenth, the Supreme Court had, in three cases, considered constitu-
tional objections to Sunday observance laws and, on all three occasions, 
rejected the objections. In those cases the unsuccessful objections to 
the laws were based upon asserted improper state regulation of inter-
state commerce,20 excessive exercise of police power,21 and denial of 
equal protection by virtue of the exemptions contained in the statute.22 
Since the First Amendment provisions with respect to religion have 
been recognized as Fourteenth Amendment limitations upon the states, 
there has been no articulate decision of the United States Supreme 
Court concerning the validity of Sunday laws. In one case the New 
York Court of Appeals sustained a Sunday law similar to that involved 
in the Chernock case over objections based, in part, upon the United 
States Constitution.23 An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, 
but it was dismissed "for want of a substantial federal question." 24 
The appeal seems to have been based upon an asserted interference 
with "free exercise" of religion, rather than upon the "an establish-
ment of religion" provision.25 
There may be discerned a disposition on the part of the Supreme 
Court, since the Zorach case,26 not to delve further into the implica-
tions of the constitutional provisions with respect to religion. In 
addition to dismissing the appeal in the New York case, it has denied 
certiorari in two other cases, in one of which official action was held 
violative of constitutional limitations in favor of religion,27 and in the 
other of which official action was sustained as not being so violative.28 
If such a disposition proves to exist, the validity of Sunday observance 
laws will remain a question for state courts of last resort. To date, no 
case has been found in which objection to Sunday observance laws, as 
such, has been sustained.29 
20 Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299, 16 Sup. Ct. 1086,41 L. Ed. 166 (1896). 
21 Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164, 20 Sup. Ct. 666, 44 L. Ed. 716 (1899); Soon 
Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703,5 Sup. Ct. 730, 28 L. Ed. 1145 (1885). 
22 Petit v. Minnesota, note 21 supra. 
23 People v. Friedman, 302 N.Y. 75,96 N.E.2d 184 (1950). 
24 Friedman v. New York, 341 U.S. 907, 71 Sup. Ct. 623, 95 L. Ed. 1345 (1951). 
25 See Summary of petition in Friedman v. New York, No. 640, October Term, 
1950, in 19 U.S. Law Week 3271 (1951). Harper and Etherington, What the Su-
preme Court Did Not Do During the 1950 Term, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 354, 386 (1951). 
26343 U.S. 306, 72 Sup. Ct. 679, 96 L. Ed. 954 (1952). 
27 Tudor v. Board, 14 N.J. 31, 100 A.2d 857 (1953), cert. denied sub nom. Gideons 
International v. Tudor, 348 U.S. 816 (1954). 
28 Gordon v. Gordon, 332 Mass. 197, 124 N.E.2d 228 (1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 
947 (1955). 
29 Sunday observance laws may present constitutional problems growing out of 
constitutional provisions other than those dealing with religion. The fairly prev-
7
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A new facet of the problem could possibly develop in a case which 
has been filed in the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts,SO but which is undecided as of the date of this writing. 
The defendant in this case has sought, on federal constitutional 
grounds, an injunction against enforcement of the statute which was 
the basis of his conviction. Whether the federal court will extend the 
McCollum 81 doctrine to Sunday observance laws, and whether the 
Supreme Court will be more receptive to "religion" questions coming 
from lower federal courts than it has been to such questions coming 
from state courts, can only be speculated upon at this time. 
§11.3. Criminal appeals: Right to free transcript of evidence at 
trial. Guerin v. Commonwealth 1 grew out of a convict's collateral at-
tack, by petition for writ of error,2 upon the judgment which had been 
rendered against him. In support of his petition he filed a motion 
that the Commonwealth furnish him a free transcript of the evidence 
taken at the trial at which he had been convicted. The motion con-
tained the uncontroverted allegation that the petitioner was indigent. 
The single justice before whom the case came allowed the motion, but 
stayed further proceedings and reported to the full bench the question 
of the correctness of his order. The order was reversed. 
The motion for the free transcript was based upon the decision of 
the Supreme Court of the United States in Griffin v. Illinois,s which 
held that when adequate review in a criminal case, available under a 
state's criminal procedure, requires the availability of a transcript of 
the trial evidence for consideration by the appellate court, a convicted 
defendant for whom a transcript is not available solely because he 
cannot afford to pay for one, and who is thereby denied adequate re-
view of his conviction, is denied equal protection of the laws in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In the Guerin case, the Supreme Judicial Court found the Griffin 
doctrine not applicable. As the Court pointed out, review in criminal 
cases may take many forms under Massachusetts procedure. There 
may be appeal from a judgment on the common law record,4 or report 
of questions of law by the trial judge either before 5 or after trial,6 or 
exceptions 7 to various acts occurring during or after trial. When 
appropriate pre-trial ruling has been made, there may be appeal upon 
alent practice of sprinkling the statutory prohibitions with exceptions of various 
activities has occasioned much litigation based upon constitutional provisions for 
equal protection of the laws. See Annotation, 57 A.L.R.2d 975 (1958). 
so Crown Kosher Super Market v. Gallagher, C.A. No. 58·471-M, U.S. District 
Court (D. Mass.). 
31333 U.S. 203, 68 Sup. Ct. 461, 92 L. Ed. 649 (1948). 
§11.3. 11958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 525, 149 N.E.2d 220. 
2 G.L., c. 250, §l. 
3351 U.S. 12,76 Sup. Ct. 585, 100 L. Ed. 891 (1956). 
4 G.L., c. 278, §28. 
5 Id. §30A. 
6 Id. §30. 
7 Id. §31. 
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the common law record, plus a transcript of the evidence and assign-
ment of errors.8 This procedure was not invoked at the trial, although 
the defendant was represented by experienced counsel. The only re-
view sought by the petitioner through his trial counsel was an appeal 
to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court for revision of the 
sentences on the five indictments of which the petitioner had been 
convicted.9 
As the Court pointed out, the scope of the writ of error is a rela-
tively narrow one, and is ordinarily limited to matters of law apparent 
on the record of the proceeding under review.1O Accordingly, the evi-
dence introduced or excluded at the trial is not ordinarily pertinent in 
this type of review.ll Thus, even if a petitioner for a writ of error 
can afford to purchase a transcript of the evidence at the trial, he 
would not be able to use it. In these circumstances, refusal to furnish 
the petitioner a transcript at public expense does not operate in any 
way as a discrimination against the petitioner because of his indigence. 
The Court recognized that in some exceptional cases, even on writ 
of error, it may be necessary to have a transcript in order to evaluate a 
petitioner's claim of fundamental error in the trial.I2 But, ruled the 
Court, in order to bring himself within the area of such extraordinary 
procedure on writ of error, the petitioner has the burden of setting. 
forth affirmatively and explicitly the facts which necessitate the use of 
a transcript of the evidence. In the Guerin case the Court concluded 
that the allegations in the petition were too "vague and sweeping" 13 
to sustain this burden. 
Although the posture in which the Guerin case was presented ob-
viated the necessity of inquiry into the conformity of Massachusetts law 
with the standard set in the Griffin case, the raising of the issue points 
up the necessity of ultimate inquiry into that question. Although one 
writer,14 in commenting upon the impact of the Griffin case upon state 
criminal procedure, classified Massachusetts as a state making tran-
scripts available free of charge to all defendants in all criminal cases, 
that statement was apparently based upon a mistaken reading of G.L., 
c. 278, §33. This statute provides for preparation, at public expense, 
of papers relative to a question of law which arises "upon appeal, ex-
ception, report or otherwise." The reference, however, is undoubtedly 
8 Id. §§1IlIA-1I1IG. 
9 Id. §§28A·28D. 
10 Dolan v. Commonwealth, 1104 Mass. 1126,211 N.E.2d 904 (19119). 
11 Berlandi v. Commonwealth, 1114 Mass. 424, 50 N.E.2d 210 (19411). 
12 Brown v. Commonwealth, 11115 Mass. 476, 140 N.E.2d 461 (1957). 
131958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 525, 5110,149 N.E.2d 220, 224. 
14 Comment, The Effect of Griffin v. Illinois on the States' Administration of the 
Criminal Law, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 161, 162, 172 (1957). This comment lists and 
classifies the laws of all the states, as of the date of the Griffin decision, concerning 
free transcripts of evidence in criminal appeals. The author places such laws in 
four categories: (I) all defendants in all criminal cases (6 states); (2) all indigent 
defendants convicted of any criminal offense (27 states); (11) all indigent defendants 
convicted of a capital offense (8 states); (4) no defendants in any criminal proceeding 
(7 states). 
9
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to appeals under Section 28, exceptions under Section 31, and reports 
under Sections 30 and 30A, none of which contemplates use of tran-
scripts of evidence. In the one review procedure in which provision is 
made for a transcript of the evidence15 the statute expressly provides 
that the defendant "shall pay for the expense of his transcript unless 
the court otherwise directs." 16 No statutory criteria exist for the trial 
court's exercise of the power to absolve the defendant from the burden 
of paying for the transcript, nor is provision made for payment of this 
expense out of the public treasury. 
Former Chief Justice Qua considered, in an extra-judicial state-
ment,17 some of the practical implications of the Griffin decision, and 
pointed out some of the considerations that should be taken into ac-
count in bringing state criminal procedure into accord with it. Chief 
among the problems which he listed in this respect are, how to prevent 
abuse of the right to a transcript at public expense by demanding a 
costly transcript in support of a "frivolous" appeal, and whether to 
extend the right to a free transcript, in cases of indigent defendants, 
to misdemeanor as well as to felony cases. 
The latter question is nearly academic in Massachusetts, since the 
statute18 permits use of transcripts in misdemeanor appeals only when 
the misdemeanor was "tried with a felony." The former question, 
however, is an extremely difficult one. Since the Griffin case, the 
United States Supreme Court has held that denial of a free transcript 
to an indigent defendant upon a federal district judge's determination 
that the proposed appeal was not being taken in good faith is review-
able upon appeal, and that the defendant is entitled to such review in 
forma pauperis.19 This doctrine would seem applicable to state court 
proceedings, particularly in the light of a more recent case in which a 
state court was reversed because the trial court had refused a free 
transcript on the ground that the appeal was not meritorious, although 
the prosecution conceded that the questions sought to be raised were 
"substantial." 20 
Since the date of the Griffin decision, one state by rule of its Supreme 
Court,21 another by judicial decision,22 and others by statutory enact-
15 G.L.. c. 278. §§33A·33G. 
161d. §33B. 
17 Qua. Griffin v. Illinois. 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 143 {1957). 
18 G.L.. c. 278. §33A. 
19 Johnson v. United States. 352 U.S. 565. 77 Sup. Ct. 550. 1 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1957). 
20 Eskridge v. Washington State Prison Board. 357 U.S. 214. 78 Sup. Ct. 1061, 
2 L. Ed. 2d 1269 (1958). 
21 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 65·1. 9 Ill. 2d 11 (1956). Ill. Ann. Stat .• c. 110. 
§1OI.65.I. And see People v. Griffin. 9 Ill. 2d 164. 137 N.E.2d 485 (1956). 
22 Petition of Patterson. 317 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1957). It may be inferred that the 
Supreme Court of North Dakota would be prepared to reach the same result. In 
State v. Moore. 82 N.W.2d 217 (N.D. 1957). an indigent defendant who had been 
convicted claimed a free transcript of the trial evidence under N.D. Rev. Code 
§27-0606 (1943). which authorizes the trial court to order a transcript at public ex-
pense "whenever in his judgment there is reasonable cauSe therefor." The opinion 
indicates a belief that if an indigent defendant can show the necessity of a transcript 
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ments23 have made explicit provision for making transcripts of evi-
dence available free of charge to indigent defendants on a basis of 
equality with persons able to pay for transcripts. It would seem de-
sirable that the Massachusetts General Court should take steps to 
clarify the right of an impecunious defendant in a case to which G.L., 
c. 278, §33A is applicable to receive a transcript of the trial evidence 
at public expense, and to seek to hedge this clarification with whatever 
safeguards against abuse can be devised. 
for adequate review of his conviction, the provision of a free transcript would be 
mandatory. As in the Guerin case, however, it was held that the defendant had 
failed to sustain the burden of making such a showing. 
23 Md. Ann. Code, Art. 5, §15A (1957), added by Md. Acts of 1958, c. 68; Minn. 
Stat. §611.07(3) (1957), added by Minn. Laws of 1957, c. 498; N.J. Stat. Ann., tit. 2A, 
§§152-17, 152-18, added by N.J. Laws of 1956, c. 134, p. 555. See also Maine Re-
solves of 1957, c. 146, providing funds to be used for operation of a system of judicial 
review in criminal cases of indigent persons involved in felonies, to be administered 
under rules to be adopted by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. 
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